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Abstract
If we combine two secure cryptographic systems, is the resulting system still secure? Answer-
ing this question is highly non-trivial and has recently sparked a considerable research effort,
in particular in the area of classical cryptography. A central insight was that the answer to
the question is yes, but only within a well specified composability framework and for carefully
chosen security definitions.
In this article, we review several aspects of composability in the context of quantum cryp-
tography. The first part is devoted to key distribution. We discuss the security criteria that
a quantum key distribution protocol must fulfill to allow its safe use within a larger security
application (e.g., for secure message transmission); and we demonstrate—by an explicit exam-
ple—what can go wrong if conventional (non-composable) security definitions are used. Finally,
to illustrate the practical use of composability, we show how to generate a continuous key stream
by sequentially composing rounds of a quantum key distribution protocol.
In a second part, we take a more general point of view, which is necessary for the study of
cryptographic situations involving, for example, mutually distrustful parties. We explain the
universal composability framework and state the composition theorem which guarantees that
secure protocols can securely be composed to larger applications. A focus is set on the secure
composition of quantum protocols into unconditionally secure classical protocols. However, the
resulting security definition is so strict that some tasks become impossible without additional
security assumptions. Quantum bit commitment is impossible in the universal composability
framework even with mere computational security. Similar problems arise in the quantum
bounded storage model and we observe a trade-off between the universal composability and the
use of the weakest possible security assumptions.
1 Introduction
Provable security, even for complex security applications, is desirable. However, giving one mono-
lithic security proof for a larger cryptosystem is error prone, and a modular design is usually advan-
tageous. But this comes with a major difficulty, namely that security definitions are not generally
closed under composition. Therefore, an application may be insecure even if the individual compo-
nents it consists of are secure. During the past few years, finding solutions to this problem has been
a main focus of research in cryptography. This research effort has resulted in the development of
frameworks in which security definitions are universally composable.
We review several aspects of composability in the context of quantum cryptography and structure
our exposition into two parts. Section 2 considers the security and composability of Quantum Key
Distribution (QKD), which is the most prominent application of quantum cryptography. In a
second part, starting with Section 3, we consider the problem of composability for general security
applications.
The reason for this organization of the paper is that for the usual treatment of QKD, one
assumes a fixed adversary structure, i.e., Alice and Bob are always honest (in particular, they trust
each other), while only a third party with access to the communication channels is malicious. This
avoids many of the problems that arise in the more general considerations outlined in Sections 3
through 5, where arbitrary parties may be corrupted.
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2 Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)
2.1 QKD in a Nutshell
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is the art of distributing a secret key to two distant parties, Alice
and Bob, connected by an insecure quantum channel. Technically, a secret key is simply a random
bitstring for which there is a certain guarantee that its value is unknown to an adversary, Eve. Such
a key may be used for a variety of cryptographic tasks. The most prominent among them is certainly
the secure transmission of secret messages over an insecure channel. Here, the key typically serves
as a one-time-pad for message encryption.
In the past two decades, numerous QKD schemes have been proposed. Although they differ in
many aspects (such as their realizability with current technology), they still very much resemble the
original protocols put forward by Bennett and Brassard [5] (based on ideas by Wiesner [48]) and by
Ekert [16]. We will not attempt here to give a description of these protocols. In fact, for the purpose
of this article, it is sufficient to take a rather abstract point of view, where the internal workings of
the protocols are unimportant. (The reader interested in the concrete protocols is referred to the
original articles [5, 16] as well as the recent review articles [38] and references therein.)
The security of QKD basically relies on an intrinsic property of quantum mechanics, namely
that it is generally impossible to copy the state of a system without disturbing the original.1 For
cryptography, this means that any attempt of an attacker to “steal” appropriately encoded informa-
tion can in principle be detected. This also motivates the basic structure of QKD protocols: first,
Alice and Bob send random signals over the quantum channel and then, in a second step, perform
tests to check for disturbances in the signals, which may be a sign of an attack. Depending on this
test, the protocol typically has one of two different outcomes. Either the disturbances are found to
be too large, in which case the protocol aborts with the declaration that no key can be generated.
Otherwise, if there are no (or only small) disturbances, Alice and Bob use the randomness in the
distributed signals to generate a key.2
Although QKD is often said to be unconditionally secure, there are still a few assumptions needed
to prove security of the generated keys. The first (usually implicit in the literature) is that Alice
and Bob are honest, meaning that they both follow their respective part of the protocol.3 Second,
it is assumed that Alice and Bob can exchange classical messages authentically, i.e., it is impossible
for an adversary to alter the classical messages exchanged between Alice and Bob. In practice, this
is usually achieved by invoking an authentication scheme (see, e.g., [46]) which, however, requires
Alice and Bob to share a short initial key. Because of this latter assumption, QKD is sometimes
called key growing rather than key distribution.
After this brief introduction, we are now ready to have a closer look at the notion of security
used in the context of QKD. We introduce an explicit definition (Section 2.2) and then show its
composability (Section 2.3). As an example, we discuss the problem of generating a continuous
key stream by sequentially composing many rounds of a QKD protocol (Section 2.4). We then
conclude the part on QKD with an example that pinpoints the problems arising when employing
a non-composable security definition, which incidentally has been widely used in the literature
(Section 2.5).
2.2 Security Criteria
To define security, we first need to have a clearer picture of what a QKD protocol is supposed
to do. We start with a list of the properties we expect an ideal protocol to have and then, in a
second step, define security of real protocols by their indistinguishability from the ideal case. In
accordance with the terminology used in the context of multi-party computation, we call these
properties secrecy, correctness, and robustness (see also [22]). We denote by SA and SB the final
outputs of the protocol on Alice and Bob’s side, respectively. Following the discussion above, the
1More precisely, it is impossible to build a physical device that takes as input an unknown quantum state and
outputs two copies of it. This impossibility is also known as non-cloning theorem. For QKD, it is important to have
a quantitative version of this statement, sometimes called information-disturbance trade-off.
2More generally, a protocol may generate keys whose length depends on an estimate of the maximum amount of
information that an adversary may have gained by an eavesdropping attack.
3Dropping this assumption leads to the additional problem of generating randomness by mutually mistrustful
parties, which is known as coin flipping [7].
2
protocol may either generate keys, in which case SA and SB are two identical random bitstrings of
a certain fixed length ℓ, or it may abort, in which case we set SA =⊥ and SB =⊥.
4 Furthermore,
we denote by E the entire (quantum) system controlled by an adversary. In particular, E contains
all the information that the adversary acquires during the run of the protocol.
We consider here the strongest type of security, namely security against general attacks. This
means that an adversary may arbitrarily tamper with the signals exchanged between Alice and
Bob over the quantum channel.5 In addition, she may eavesdrop (but not alter) the classical
communication. We also introduce the notion of a passive adversary, who does not disturb the
quantum communication. Formally, this simply means that the behavior of the quantum channel
is described by a fixed noise model. For QKD based on qubit-systems, for instance, the standard is
to consider channels that introduce random bit- and phase-flips (with a given probability).
Perfect Security. We now say that a QKD scheme is perfectly secure if the following holds for
any attack.
Correctness: The outputs of the protocol on Alice and Bob’s side are identical (i.e., SA = SB).
Secrecy: If the protocol produces a key SA (i.e., if SA 6=⊥) then SA is uniformly distributed and
independent of the state of the system E held by the adversary.6
Robustness: If the adversary is passive then a key is generated (i.e., SA 6=⊥).
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It is easy to see that none of these criteria can be dropped without making the task trivial. In
fact, without the correctness requirement, a protocol may just produce uncorrelated randomness on
Alice and Bob’s side. Similarly, without the robustness requirement, a protocol may always output
SA = SB =⊥.
Approximate Security. Unfortunately, it is (provably) impossible to design a QKD protocol
that is perfectly secure according to the above definition. One thus typically considers a relaxation
where the requirement is that the behavior of the scheme is similar (but not necessarily equal)
to an idealized scheme which is perfectly secure. This can be made precise using the notion of
indistinguishability.
More specifically, one considers a hypothetical device, called distinguisher, which interacts with
either the real protocol, in the following denoted Preal, or an ideal protocol, P ideal, and then outputs
a guess bit B. The distinguisher may have access to all regular inputs and outputs of the protocol (in
our case, we only have outputs, namely SA and SB) as well as to the system E normally controlled
by the adversary. We say that Preal and P ideal are ε-indistinguishable for ε ≥ 0 if, for any such
distinguisher,
Pr[B = 1|Preal]− Pr[B = 1|P ideal] ≤ ε . (1)
Here Pr[B = 1|Preal] and Pr[B = 1|P ideal] denote the probabilities that the distinguisher’s output
B equals 1 when interacting with Preal and P ideal, respectively.
The notion of ε-indistinguishability naturally leads to the following definition of ε-security.
Definition 1. A QKD protocol Preal is ε-secure if it is ε-indistinguishable from a (hypothetical)
protocol P ideal which is perfectly secure, i.e., P ideal satisfies the correctness, the secrecy, and the
robustness criteria above.
4Alternatively, the length ℓ of the generated key may be determined during the run of the protocol, with ℓ = 0 if
the protocol aborts (see, e.g., [3]). For practical applications, however, it is usually more convenient to work with a
fixed key length.
5One sometimes restricts the security analysis to more restricted types of attacks. An example are collective
attacks [6], where it is assumed that the adversary acts on each of the signals sent through the channel independently
and identically. This is useful because, for most protocols, security against collective attacks implies security against
general attacks [33, 34].
6Because of the correctness property, it is sufficient to require secrecy for either SA or SB .
7Note that this property is always relative to a given noise model of the quantum channel.
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Intuitively, the parameter ε can be understood as the maximum failure probability of the proto-
col Preal, i.e., the maximum probability that Preal deviates from the behavior of the ideal protocol
P ideal.8 For practical considerations, is often useful to quantify the correctness, secrecy, and robust-
ness of a protocol separately. The following definition is an obvious generalization of the above.
Definition 2. A QKD protocol is ε-correct, ε-secret, or ε-robust if it is ε-indistinguishable from a
perfectly correct, secure, or robust scheme, respectively.
Remark 3. One can show that, if a protocol is εc-correct, εs-secret, and εr-robust then it is ε-secure,
for ε = εc + εs + εr.
The requirements on the different parameters are generally quite diverse. Typically, a relatively
large value εr for the robustness (e.g., εr = 0.1) can be tolerated, because the protocol may just
be repeated in case it does not generate a key. In contrast, the parameter εs for the secrecy can
be interpreted as the (maximum) probability by which an adversary may get secret information
without being detected, which one typically wants to keep small (e.g., εs = 10
−10).
It is easy to see that ε-correctness is equivalent to the requirement that the outputs SA and SB
produced by the protocol on Alice and Bob’s side differ only with small probability,
Pr[SA 6= SB] ≤ ε . (2)
Similarly, for ε-robustness, the requirement is that
Pr[SA =⊥] ≤ ε (3)
holds whenever the adversary is passive. The situation is a bit more subtle (and more interesting)
for the secrecy criterion, which can be made more concrete as follows.
Let S := {0, 1}ℓ be the key space, i.e., the output SA takes values in the set S∪{⊥}. Furthermore,
for any fixed value s ∈ S ∪ {⊥} of SA, let the state of the system E be denoted by ρ
s
E . The joint
state of SA and E can then be represented as a cq-state
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ρSAE =
∑
s∈S∪{⊥}
ps|s〉〈s| ⊗ ρ
s
E
where ps is the probability that SA = s and where {|s〉}s∈S∪{⊥} is a family of orthonormal vectors.
It is easy to see that, for any attack, the state resulting from the run of a perfectly secure scheme
has the form
ρperfectSAE = (1− p⊥)
∑
s∈S
1
|S|
|s〉〈s| ⊗ ρ′E + p⊥| ⊥〉〈⊥ | ⊗ ρ
′′
E , (4)
where p⊥ ∈ [0, 1] and where ρ
′
E and ρ
′′
E are density operators. With these definitions, we arrive at
a reformulation of ε-secrecy in terms of the trace distance [35, 3].10
Lemma 4. A QKD protocol is ε-secret if and only if, for any attack, the cq-state ρSAE describing
the joint state of the protocol output SA and the system E held by the adversary satisfies
1
2
∥∥ρSAE − ρperfectSAE
∥∥
1
≤ ε (5)
for some state ρperfectSAE of the form (4).
In security proofs, correctness and secrecy are usually established by separate arguments. While
the correctness parameter εc is essentially determined by the quality of the error correction procedure
used to reconcile the raw keys, the secrecy εs rests upon various other elements of the protocol. In
the simplest case, εs is a function of the accuracy of the estimation procedure, which measures the
disturbances of the transmitted signals, as well as of the parameters of the privacy amplification
step, which is used to transform the (partially secret) raw key into a final secret key satisfying (5).
8This intuition can be made precise in a purely classical context [27].
9The state of a bipartite system is called classical-quantum (cq) if the first subsystem is purely classical (in the
sense that its states are perfectly distinguishable.)
10Lemma 4 is an immediate consequence of the well known one-to-one relation between the indistinguishability of
two quantum states and their trace distance.
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Figure 1: Indistinguishability. The combination of the original distinguisher D with Areal gives
a new distinguisher D′ for Preal and P ideal.
2.3 Composing QKD with Other Cryptographic Primitives
Since a secret random string is of little interest by itself, QKD is almost never used as a stand-
alone application. Instead, one typically is interested in higher cryptographic tasks such as secure
message transmission. QKD then just serves as a mechanism to provide the key material needed by
the application. In addition, QKD often is built on top of other cryptographic primitives such as
authentication schemes, whose task is to make sure the adversary cannot alter the classical messages
sent over the insecure channel. Hence, composability of the underlying security definitions is vital
in the context of QKD.
What Does Composability Mean? To get a more precise understanding of the notion of com-
posability in the context of QKD, we consider a situation where the key produced by a QKD protocol
Preal is later used in an application Areal, e.g., an encryption scheme. Assume that the protocol Preal
is ε1-secure, and let the application A
real be ε2-secure, i.e., ε2-indistinguishable from an idealized
application Aideal. The claim then is that the composite system, denoted Areal ◦ Preal, where the
application Areal is fed with the key produced by Preal, is ε-secure, for ε = ε1 + ε2.
The claim becomes even simpler in the special case where Areal is based on one-time-pad encryp-
tion. When being fed with a perfectly secret key, one-time-pad encryption is indistinguishable from
a perfect encryption procedure, which simply produces a ciphertext that is statistically independent
of the message. We thus have ε2 = 0. Hence, according to the above claim, when one-time-pad
encryption is combined with an ε1-secure QKD protocol P
real, the resulting scheme is ε1-secure.
That is, it produces ciphertexts which are ε1-indistinguishable from uniform randomness.
Why Is Our Definition Composable? Roughly speaking, the security parameters ε1 and ε2
can be understood as the maximum failure probabilities of Preal and Areal, respectively (see the
paragraph after Definition 1). Hence, according to the union bound, if one combines Preal and
Areal, the total failure probability cannot be larger than ε = ε1+ ε2. This already gives an intuitive
understanding why the combined scheme Areal ◦ Preal is ε-secure, as claimed above.
We will now give a slightly more rigorous argument for this claim. Assume by contradiction that
the composite system Areal ◦ Preal is not ε-indistinguishable from Aideal ◦ P ideal, i.e., there exists a
distinguisher D whose output B satisfies
Pr[B = 1|Areal ◦ Preal]− Pr[B = 1|Aideal ◦ P ideal] > ε = ε1 + ε2 (6)
(cf. (1)). Assume now that we use the same distinguisher D to distinguish Areal ◦ Preal from
Areal ◦ P ideal, where the latter denotes the composite scheme consisting of the real application
fed with a key produced by a perfect QKD scheme. Because Areal is identical in both cases, we
can alternatively treat Areal as part of a (more complex) distinguisher D′ which now interacts
with either Preal or P ideal (see Fig. 1). Because, by assumption, Preal is ε1-secure and, hence,
ε1-indistinguishable from P
ideal, we find
Pr[B = 1|Areal ◦ Preal]− Pr[B = 1|Areal ◦ P ideal] ≤ ε1 . (7)
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Figure 2: Generation of a continuous key stream by sequential composition of rounds of
a QKD protocol. The scheme starts with an initial key pair S0 = (S0A, S
0
B). In each round i, the
QKD protocol Pi generates a fresh pair S
i = (SiA, S
i
B) of keys of length ℓ + ℓi, using ℓi−1 bits of
existing key material for authentication. ℓ bits of the fresh key are added to the key stream, whereas
ℓi bits are passed to the next round for authentication.
Similarly, because Areal is ε-indistinguishable from Aideal, we find
Pr[B = 1|Areal ◦ P ideal]− Pr[B = 1|Aideal ◦ P ideal] ≤ ε2 . (8)
Combining (7) and (8) contradicts (6) and, hence, concludes our proof of composability.
2.4 Example Application: Generating a Continuous Key Stream
As already mentioned, composability of the keys produced by a QKD scheme is crucial because
these are typically used in further applications. Here, we consider their use for authentication in
subsequent rounds of a QKD protocol. The method described below can be employed to generate a
continuous stream of key material. This may be of interest for various practical applications, such
as the encryption of a continuous stream of data.
Description of the Scheme. We are looking at the (realistic) situation where the communication
channels connecting Alice and Bob may be completely insecure, so that not even authenticity is
guaranteed. Instead, we assume that Alice and Bob hold an initial key pair (S0A, S
0
B) of length ℓ0
which is ε0-secure. They then repeat the following for any i ∈ N (see Fig. 2). A QKD protocol Pi is
invoked, which uses the first ℓi−1 bits of the key pair (S
i−1
A , S
i−1
B ) for authentication. The protocol
generates a new (longer) key pair (SiA, S
i
B) of length ℓi + ℓ, of which the first ℓi bits are stored for
use in the next round, while the last ℓ bits form part of the output stream.
Security Analysis. In the following, we are going to analyze the security of the key stream.
Because of composability, this is conceptually very easy—we simply need to add up the security
parameters. If the protocol Pi executed in each round i is εi-secure then the security ε of the final
stream is always bounded by
ε ≤
∞∑
i=0
εi . (9)
In order to get a reasonable value for ε, we need to make sure that the parameters εi are suffi-
ciently small. However, making εi small generally comes at the cost of increasing the communication
complexity of the protocol as well as the length ℓi−1 of the initial key used for authentication. As
a rough estimate of the performance of a typical QKD protocol, we use here a bound of the form
εi ≤ e
−γ(ρni−ℓi−ℓ) + e−νℓi−1+log ni (10)
where ni denotes the number of quantum signals exchanged during the protocol and where γ, ρ, and
ν are positive constants.11 The first term corresponds to the security of the protocol if used with
an authentic classical channel. Note that the exponent critically depends on the length ℓi+ ℓ of the
key that is generated. The second term is due to the imperfectness of the authentication scheme.
11Values of ρ = 10−2 and γ = ν = 10−3 may be realistic for textbook protocols such as BB84 with single photons.
We refer to [39, 8] for a more detailed numerical analysis of the performance of QKD protocols.
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To make sure that (9) converges, it is necessary to increase the number ni of exchanged signals
in each round of the protocol. For the purpose of illustration,12 we set
ni := n+ ci and ℓi := ℓ + cρi/2
for some constants n ∈ N and c > 0. Inserting this into (10) results in a bound on εi such that the
sum over i is a geometric series. Hence, by appropriately choosing the constants ℓ, n, and c, the
security parameter ε of the key stream can be made arbitrarily small.
2.5 An Explicit Attack Exploiting Non-Composability
The necessity of composable security definitions has only been realized recently. In fact, most of
the original security proofs proposed in the literature were relative to a security criterion that is
not composable. The main purpose of this section is to illustrate what can go wrong if such a
non-composable security definition is used.
Measuring Secrecy. As we have seen in Section 2.2, the correctness and the robustness property
are rather unproblematic. In particular, both of them can be expressed as the condition that certain
probabilities are small (cf. (2) and (3)). This is different for the secrecy property. Intuitively, a key
SA is secret if an adversary has only little information about it, in the sense of (5). There are,
however, a variety of alternative information measures, and this is indeed the source of the problem
we are going to describe now.
One such information measure is the accessible information, denoted Iacc(· : ·). It is particularly
suitable to quantify the information a quantum system (in our case the system E held by the
adversary) gives about a classical value (the key SA). The accessible information is defined in terms
of the Shannon mutual information, I(· : ·),
Iacc(SA : E) := max
Z
I(SA : Z) ,
where the maximum is taken over all random variables Z that can be obtained by measuring the
quantum system E.
Recall that, according to Lemma 4, the key SA generated by a QKD protocol is ε-secret if and
only if
1
2
∥∥ρSAE −∑
s
1
|S|
|s〉〈s| ⊗ ρ′E
∥∥
1
≤ ε (11)
holds for some ρ′E . (We assume here for simplicity that the protocol always outputs a key, i.e.,
p⊥ = 0.) Since a measurement cannot increase the trace distance, this immediately gives a bound
on the distance between the joint distribution PSAZ of the key SA and the outcome Z of any
measurement applied to E, and a distribution of the form PS × P
′
Z where PS denotes a uniform
distribution over the key space,
1
2
∥∥PSAZ − PU × P ′Z‖1 ≤ ε . (12)
For small values of ε, Fano’s inequality implies that I(S : Z) and, hence, the accessible information
Iacc(SA : E), is small, too.
13 In other words, the secrecy criterion (11) is at least as strong as a
criterion based on the accessible information.
The converse, however, is not true. To illustrate this, we construct an explicit example quan-
tum state ρSAE for which the accessible information is (arbitrarily) small, whereas the key SA is
insecure when being used for one-time pad encryption. The state ρSAE thus necessarily violates the
(composable) secrecy criterion (11). From this, we conclude that small accessible information does
not imply secrecy in the sense of Definition 2.
12The example should be understood as a proof of principle. We have not attempted to optimize parameters.
13More precisely, (11) implies Iacc(SA : E) ≤ 2nε + 4h(ε) where n is the key length and h is the binary entropy.
(Since ε is usually chosen exponentially small in n, the same is true for the term 2nε.)
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Construction of the Example. Our example consists of a uniformly distributed (n + 1)-bit
key SA = (S1, . . . , Sn+1) and an n-qubit system E. Furthermore, we consider an n-tuple of bits
R = (R1, . . . , Rn) whose sum modulo 2 equals Sn+1,
R1 ⊕ · · · ⊕Rn = Sn+1 , (13)
but which are otherwise completely random. Then, for any fixed SA = s = (s1, . . . , sn, sn+1) and
R = r = (r1, . . . , rn) satisfying (13), we define the state |φ
s,r〉 of E by
|φs,r〉 := |r1〉s1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |rn〉sn ,
where |ri〉si , for any i = 1, . . . , n, denotes the state of a qubit encoding the classical bit ri in either
some specified standard basis {|0〉, |1〉} (if si = 0) or the corresponding diagonal basis (if si = 1),
i.e.,
|0〉0 = |0〉
|0〉1 =
√
1
2
(
|0〉+ |1〉
)
|1〉0 = |1〉
|1〉1 =
√
1
2
(
|0〉 − |1〉
)
.
In particular, the density operator ρsE describing the state of E conditioned on SA = s (but ran-
domized over R) is given by
ρsE = 2
−(n−1)
∑
(r1,...,rn)
r1⊕···⊕rn=sn+1
|φs,r〉〈φs,r| .
We now move on to the proof of the claims made above. First, we show that the accessible infor-
mation Iacc(SA : E) is small. This implies that (12) holds for some small ε (see, e.g., Lemma 12.6.1
of [12]). Second, we describe an attack against a scheme where the key SA is used for one-time-pad
encryption. The attack allows the adversary to learn one bit of the message with certainty. This,
in particular, implies that the (composable) secrecy criterion (11) cannot hold for any non-trivial
value of ε.
Small Accessible Information. We do not attempt here to give a rigorous proof of the above
claim but rather describe the intuition for it. For the details of the argument we refer to [23].
In order to prove that Iacc(SA : E) is small, we need to argue that any outcome Z of a mea-
surement applied to E has only negligible correlation with SA. To simplify this task, we split
SA = (S1, . . . , Sn+1) into two parts and make use of the chain rule for the mutual information,
I(SA : Z) = I(S1 · · ·Sn : Z) + I(Sn+1 : Z|S1 · · ·Sn) .
Note that the state of each qubit of E is an encoding of a random bit Ri, where only the basis
depends on Si. The overall state of E conditioned on (S1, . . . , Sn) is thus fully mixed and, hence,
independent of the value of (S1, . . . , Sn). This immediately implies I(S1 · · ·Sn : Z) = 0 and it thus
remains to be shown that I(Sn+1 : Z|S1 · · ·Sn) is small.
For this, let us first assume that the measurement giving Z consists of n independent measure-
ments applied to the individual qubits of E. Each of them would then result in an estimate for
the value of a bit Ri, for i = 1, . . . , n. However, since each bit Ri is encoded in a random basis
determined by Si, and since the bit Si is unknown at the time of the measurement, the maximum
probability p of obtaining the correct outcome Ri is bounded away from 1, i.e., p < 1.
Now, recall that the key bit Sn+1 is equal to the sum modulo 2 of the random bits R1, . . . Rn.
Hence, using the measurement strategy described above, the correct value of Sn+1 can only be
obtained if all the individual measurements are successful. The probability that this happens can
be shown to be exponentially small n.14 We thus conclude that the correlation between the key bit
Sn+1 and the measurement outcome Z is small.
14More precisely, given Z, the probability of correctly guessing Sn+1 is not larger than the probability of guessing
an independent random bit, except with probability exponentially small in n.
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This argument can be generalized to arbitrary measurement strategies [23]. It turns out that
the above individual strategy is essentially optimal, i.e., I(Sn+1 : Z|S1 · · ·Sn) is small for any
measurement. In fact, a quantitative analysis15 (for a slightly modified example) gives I(SA, Z) <
2−
n−2
6 and, hence, Iacc(SA : E) ≤ 2
−n−2
6 .
The Attack. Let us now have a look at what happens if we use the key SA = (S1, . . . , Sn+1)
for one-time-pad encryption. By definition, for any message M = (M1, . . . ,Mn+1), the ciphertext
C = (C1, . . . , Cn+1) is given by Ci = Mi ⊕ Si. In the following, we assume that the adversary has
full access to C.
To understand the relevance of the example, it is important to realize that we can, in general, not
assume that the messageM is uniformly distributed.16 To the contrary, almost any realistic message
will consist of biased bits or bits that are (partially) known to an adversary. In fact, the history of
cryptography is full of examples where prior knowledge about the structure of the messages has been
exploited for attacks. For our specific attack, we consider the extreme case where the adversary
already knows the first n message bits (M1, . . . ,Mn) but tries to get information about the bit
Mn+1. (For example, the first n bits may contain standardized header information while the actual
message starts with the (n+ 1)th bit.
Given the first n bits of both the message and the ciphertext, the adversary can obviously
determine the first n key bits S1, . . . , Sn by Si = Mi ⊕ Ci. This by itself would not be problematic
because, after all, the very nature of a one-time-pad is that it is only used once. However, the
adversary may now use her knowledge of S1, . . . , Sn to extract further information from the quantum
system E. More precisely, because by construction the bits S1, . . . , Sn determine the basis in which
the valuesRi are encoded in E, the adversary can apply a measurement which produces the outcomes
R1, . . . , Rn. From this, she may determine the (n + 1)th key bit Sn+1 = R1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Rn and, in
particular, the message bit Mn+1 = Sn+1 ⊕ Cn+1 with certainty.
Discussion. Our example shows that the accessible information is an inappropriate measure for
quantifying secrecy: Even tough the accessible information Iacc(SA, E) that an adversary has on
the key SA is small, the key SA cannot safely be used for tasks such as one-time-pad encryption.
The example also answers a question raised by Ben-Or et al. in [3]. They have shown that a
QKD protocol which generates an n-bit key SA is ε-secure whenever
Iacc(SA : E) ≤ 2
−(n+2)ε2 .
An immediate implication of our argument above is that this result is essentially tight. In other
words, in order to get (composable) security from a bound on Iacc(SA : E), this bound must be
exponentially small in the key size. Unfortunately, however, this criterion is not met by most known
security proofs that refer to the accessible information (see [23] for references).
In order to prove security of a given QKD scheme, it is thus more advisable to directly derive a
bound on the trace distance in (11) (rather than on the accessible information). Such a bound can
in principle be obtained by a modification of the well-known argument by Shor and Preskill [40],
which however only applies to specific types of protocols. A more generic approach is to use the
fact that privacy amplification based on suitably chosen hash functions (e.g., two-universal hashing)
directly produces keys that satisfy (11), provided the input to the hash function (the raw key) has
sufficiently high entropy [35] (see [14, 42] for specific examples of such hash functions).
3 Composability of General Secure Applications
In the following sections, which constitute the second part of the article, we consider security defi-
nitions for general cryptographic tasks and the problem of composing secure protocols to complex
security applications.
15For technical reasons, the argument of [23] is based on an extended construction where the bits Ri are encoded
with respect to three (rather than two) different mutually unbiased bases.
16It is possible to design encryption schemes whose security is based on the additional assumption that the dis-
tribution of the messages is highly random from the adversary’s point of view [36] (this is also known as entropic
security). Interestingly, these schemes only require a short key.
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We will describe a quantum model of security [43, 4, 45] which gives strong composability guar-
antees. The composition theorem (see Subsection 5.1) states that a protocol secure in this model can
be used in an arbitrary application without lowering the overall security. Furthermore an arbitrary
number of protocols proven secure in this model can be used concurrently and remain secure in the
model. We will have to neglect many details (already [9] has 128 pages and describes the classical
case). Our treatment will be on a more intuitive and abstract level. For details please see [43, 4, 45].
One could argue that this topic need not be discussed in an article about quantum cryptography
as the most important building blocks of general applications, i.e. protocols like coin flipping, bit
commitment, or oblivious transfer, can in quantum cryptography not be achieved with unconditional
security [1, 28, 25]. However, there still are enough interesting applications for quantum cryptogra-
phy. Even if some tasks are impossible to achieve in principle it is possible to achieve them relative
to security assumptions which are independent of the computational assumptions of classical cryp-
tography [37, 13]. Furthermore, many of the assumptions possible, like the adversary being able to
store only a limited amount of qubits or the adversary being unable to maintain coherency for large
quantum states are very reasonable.
In addition a quantum model of security is not only useful to analyze or prove the security of
quantum protocols, but it can also be used to investigate the security of classical protocols against
quantum adversaries. It was in the context of composability that the question was answered if
quantum attacks on classical protocols give more power to the adversary than a mere speed up of
computations [45] (see Subsection 5.2).
4 Defining Security
Key exchange and secure message transmission is one of the most important prerequisites of general
security applications, however, general applications can require further security properties. As
examples consider secure authentication, digital signatures, online banking, or remote voting. One
of the big differences of such applications to key exchange is that the protocols participants are
mutually mistrusting. Secure function evaluation [49, 17] is a generalization of such cryptographic
applications: In a secure function evaluation a set of players P1, . . . , Pn wishes to evaluate a function
f on inputs x1, . . . , xn they hold respectively such that corrupted players cannot change the outcome
of the computation (other than choosing a different input) and corrupted players do not learn more
about the input of honest players than can be derived from their own input and the output of the
function evaluation. These two properties of secure function evaluation are called correctness and
privacy. However, it turned out that these two properties alone do not cover what one intuitively
requires from a secure computation. Additional properties were added, like the independence of
inputs which demands that it should not be possible for a corrupted player to choose his own input
dependent on the secret inputs of honest parties. It is easy to see that the property of independence
of inputs is not logically implied by privacy or correctness if one does not demand that each protocol
participant knows its input from the start. There are more security properties which are not implied
by privacy and correctness: robustness requires that no corrupted player may abort the protocol,
fairness demands that even if an abort cannot be prevented it should not be possible for the
adversary to learn more about the result of the computation than the honest players, and zero
knowledge is the property that a real protocol transcript could also have been generated by a single
machine without knowledge of any secret involved in the protocol. Defining security via a list of
security properties became known as the list approach, however, researchers got the impression that
one might never know if the list of security properties is complete.
4.1 The Simulation Paradigm
A new security definition was needed. It should be convincing and (as general applications are to
be considered) independent of the specific goals the attacker might have. The first step towards this
new definition was the discovery of zero knowledge proofs [18] where the simulation paradigm was
introduced.
Instead of considering different security properties the new notion was based on indistinguisha-
bility. Intuitively speaking, a real protocol is compared to an ideal protocol where a trusted party
collected the inputs from the protocol participants, computes the output and distributes the output
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to the participants. If the real protocol and the ideal protocol have an indistinguishable input output
behavior the real protocol is said to be at least as secure as the ideal protocol. Such a definition of
security defines security of a real protocol relative to an idealization. The level of security reached
thus also depends on the specification of the ideal protocol.
In the case of quantum key distribution we have already seen a security definition which compares
a real key exchange with an ideal situation, however, unlike to the general case it was possible to
reduce this security notion to the fulfillment of separate security properties (see Section 2.2).
In the real model the protocol is attacked by a real attacker which may corrupt protocol par-
ticipants, pools all their data, and lets the corrupted participants deviate from the protocol in an
arbitrary way. In the ideal protocol there is a an ideal attacker (also called simulator) which must
be able to provide an output indistinguishable from the output of the real attacker while having
access only to the inputs and outputs of the corrupted players. As the ideal attacker does not learn
any real protocol messages or secrets which cannot be derived from the input and output of the
corrupted players the indistinguishability guarantees that the real protocol does not leak any secrets
to the real attacker.
However, there are certain ”attacks” which cannot be prevented, e.g. an adversary could replace
his input by a different value. These inevitable attacks are not considered to violate the security and
hence we must be able to model these attacks in the ideal protocol as well. These inevitable attacks
will be carried out by the simulator, too. The ideal attacker may corrupt protocol participants in the
ideal model, but all the ideal attacker can do is to replace local inputs or to replace local outputs.
If the real attacker may corrupt more than a minority of the protocol participants then the attacker
can always abort the computation and we have to give this ability to the ideal adversary as well.
Stating the exact definition here goes beyond the scope of this article (it can be found in [17]),
especially because this notion of security does not yet allow for composition as we will illustrate
below.
Note that this definition of security requires the ideal attacker (simulator) to provide his output
only after termination of the protocol, i.e., in retrospect and thus with the benefit of hindsight.
This gives a certain ”advantage” to the ideal attacker without which a simulation would become
impossible in most cases. The ability to provide a simulation of a real protocol without any advantage
over a real attacker would in many cases imply the complete insecurity of the real protocol as the
real attacker could use the program of the simulator to cheat in the real execution of the protocol.
What is important in this context is that this advantage of the simulator should not invalidate the
”idealness” of the ideal model.
This simulation in retrospect does not violate the ”idealness”, because the result of an ideal
protocol is not altered by this (the protocol remains correct) and no secrets of honest participants
are leaked. However, as we will see in Subsection 4.3, this ability of simulating in retrospect does
not play well with composition or with protocols which accept inputs not only at the start, but
also at later times (protocols realizing so called reactive functionalities which are a generalization
of secure function evaluation).
4.2 A Motivating Example: Secure Composition as a Problem
Below we will give two examples illustrating what can happen when protocols are composed. The
first is a classical example from classical cryptography where a message from one subprotocol of a
larger application is fed into another subprotocol and the overall application becomes insecure. The
second example shows that quantum information can be used in different subprotocols such that
entanglement spans over different subprotocols.
4.2.1 Malleability—a Classical Example
A very simple example of this kind is an (simplified) auction protocol. We assume a trusted auc-
tioneer in possession of a RSA public key (n, e). For an auction the auctioneer accepts bids which
are encrypted with his public key. After receiving all the bids the auctioneer decrypts the cipher
texts with his secret key d and publishes the highest bid together with the winner of the auction.
The RSA encryption keeps eavesdroppers from learning bids of competitors. This seems to imply
that the bids of the dishonest participants must be chosen independently of the bids of the honest
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participants. However, astonishingly this is not necessarily the case: Given an honest Alice, a dis-
honest Bob and let all encryptions be done by ”textbook RSA17”. If now Alice bids the amount m
then she sends c = me mod n to the auctioneer. Bob can, after learning this ciphertext c compute
2e ∗ c mod n which equals an encryption of 2 ∗m with the public key (n, e).
So without knowing the amount of Alice’s bid Bob is able to compute a ciphertext which encrypts
a higher bid and so he will win the auction. This security weakness is called malleability [15] and it
is not per se a weakness of textbook RSA, but becomes a problem when textbook RSA is used in
certain larger applications.
4.2.2 Quantum Superpositions can Span over several Subprotocols
Quantum bit commitment, i.e. the cryptographic equivalent to a sealed envelope, has been shown
to be impossible with unconditional security. However, it is tempting to try to circumvent this
impossibility theorem of Mayers [28] and Lo/Chau [25] by a clever composition of possible quantum
protocols. One could try to build up a secure bit commitment from weaker primitives like cheat
sensitive commitments [19]. However, the impossibility theorem rules this out and therefore shows
that composing quantum protocols can be counter intuitive. One cannot treat the subprotocols as
being ”atomic” and quantum superpositions being limited to occur only within the subprotocols. It
is possible to keep all quantum information in the different subprotocols in one large superposition
and the attack of Mayers and Lo/Chau does exactly that.
4.3 Types of Protocol Composition
Two kinds of protocol composition can be distinguished:
Simple Composition for which an example was given in the previous subsection. In simple
composition a single instance of a cryptographic primitive is replaced by a real subprotocol. Now
messages from the surrounding protocol which may depend on secrets of uncorrupted parties can
be injected into the subprotocol or vice versa: a corrupted player can use messages from within
a subprotocol outside of this subprotocol. This access to protocol messages which may depend on
secrets of uncorrupted parties give an enormous strength to the adversary not present in stand alone
models of security. In the quantum world it is additionally possible to entangle messages used in
different protocols.
In the case of Concurrent Composition many instances of the same protocol with correlated
inputs are run concurrently. Apart from the problems of simple composition, that messages from
one protocol could be fed into another [30], an additional problem occurs if one allows more than
a constant number of protocol instances to be run concurrently. Even though each single instance
of the protocol is secure in the sense of simulatability it could be that the multiple rounds of the
different protocol instances are interleaved in a way that messages in one instance of the protocol
affect messages in other protocols and no polynomial time simulation strategy to obtain a consistent
simulation for all protocols is known.
So in a notion of security allowing for secure composition the simulator should work even if the
protocol is run in an arbitrary application context. This implies that the simulation cannot be done
in retrospect as the real adversary could feed information into surrounding protocols at any time.
This requirement of a straight line simulator is very strict, however, according to [24] it is close to
the minimal requirement if one wants to combine the requirements of stand alone simulatability and
the notion of security being preserved if run in arbitrary applications.
5 The Universal Composability Framework
The basic idea of the Universal Composability (UC) framework and why this notion of security
allows for secure composition is that the stand alone simulatability definition of security from [17]
is enriched by an additional machine, an environment machine which interacts with the proto-
col and the attacker while it can emulate arbitrary surrounding protocols.18 Starting from this
17This refers to the originally published version of RSA where a ciphertext c for a message m is deterministically
computed via c = me mod n and decryption is done via m = cd mod n.
18In Section 2.3 this environment was only implicit, because the interaction with other protocols is simpler than in
the general case: key distribution has no input and guarantees no security if one of the parties is corrupted.
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classical universal composability framework [9] and independently discovered concept of reactive
simulatability[31, 2] two quantum models of security were defined in [43, 4]. Both models follow the
same motivation, but differ in details which are not of importance in this overview.
The model of [43] is described in three steps. First the machines and their network is defined,
next the behavior of the machines is defined according to their roles in a protocol, then the security
definition is given based on the indistinguishability of two protocols (the real and the ideal protocol).
In our overview many details have to be omitted. For details consult [43, 45].
Machines and Networks. Quantum machines have internal states which may be quantum and
the state transition operator is a trace preserving superoperator on the Hilbert space spanned by
the tensor product of the possible internal states, the possible inputs and the possible outputs of
the machine. The machines are connected by an asynchronous quantum network, i.e., (quantum)
messages between machines may be blocked or delayed. Only one machine may be active at any
time and the scheduling is message driven, i.e., a machine sending away a message is switching to
a waiting state while the receiving machine is activated19.
The scheduling is classical, i.e., machines are not active and inactive in superposition nor are
messages sent and not sent in superposition. This makes the model usable, but it excludes the
possibility of certain protocols detecting a traffic analysis [29, 41].
Protocol, Adversary, and Environment. Apart from the protocol participants which are spec-
ified by the protocol there are two more machines taking part in the protocol execution. The adver-
sary A (or S in the ideal model) is the machine coordinating all corrupted participants analogous
to the stand-alone model in Section 4.1. The environment machine Z chooses the inputs20, sees
the output, and may communicate with the adversary at any time. The environment machine can
emulate arbitrary surrounding protocols and can hence detect vulnerabilities which would result
from protocol composition.
The Security Definition. We demand the environment machine to produce a classical output
and we say that a protocol π implements an ideal protocol F with perfect security if for every
adversary A there exists an ideal adversary S such that for every environment machine Z the
distribution of the outputs of Z when interacting with A and π equals the distribution of the
outputs of Z when interacting with S and F . A protocol π realizes F with statistical security if the
output distribution of Z when interacting with A and π is statistically indistinguishable21 from the
output distribution of Z when interacting with F and S.
Quantum cryptography usually aims at achieving statistical security where the adversary may
be limited only by the laws of quantum mechanics. It does, however, make sense to also define
computational security in the quantum setting, because quantum cryptography can realize tasks
with computational security which are believed to be impossible classically22.
A machine is said to be quantum polynomial time if it can be invoked only a polynomial number of
times in the security parameter k and the input output behavior of the machine can be simulated by a
quantum Turing machine in polynomial time in k. If now all protocol participants, the adversary and
the environment machine are quantum polynomial machines then we say that a protocol π realizes
F with quantum computational security if for all A there exists a S such that for all Z the output
distribution of Z when interacting with A and π is indistinguishable in quantum polynomial time
from the output distribution of Z when interacting with F and S. I.e. if we denote by outπ,A,Z the
random variable of the output of Z in the real protocol and by outF ,S,Z the corresponding random
variable for the ideal model then we demand that for every quantum polynomial machine D it holds
that |P (D(outπ,A,Z) → 1) − P (D(outF ,S,Z) → 1)| is negligible in the security parameter (where a
function ǫ is called negligible if it is asymptotically smaller than any 1/kn for every constant n).
19One distinguished machine, called master scheduler, will be invoked if this rule does not apply.
20In case of a reactive functionality inputs can also depend on previous outputs or on protocol messages.
21In the case of key distribution this amounts to approximate security with ε negligible, i.e. asymptotically smaller
than any 1/kn.
22E.g. realizing oblivious transfer from a one way function [50, 21].
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5.1 The Composition Theorem
The UC framework provides a very strict notion of security and for a protocol ρ securely realizing an
ideal protocol F in the UC framework strong composition guarantees can be obtained. We denote
by πF that a protocol π invokes a protocol F as a subprotocol and by πρ that F has been replaced by
a protocol ρ. We write π ≥ ρ to denote that the protocol π securely realizes ρ in the UC framework.
Now the (simple) composition theorem (see [43, 45]) states that if ρ ≥ F then πρ securely realizes
πF . Especially if πF securely realizes a functionality G then also πρ realizes G.
If we denote by ρ∗ the concurrent composition of (polynomially many) instances of ρ and by
F∗ the concurrent composition of (polynomially many) instances of F . Then the (concurrent)
composition theorem guarantees that if ρ ≥ F it also holds that ρ∗ ≥ F∗.
Combining simple and concurrent composition we obtain the composition theorem where a larger
application π may use multiple instances of a subprotocol: Given a protocol ρ which securely realizes
a protocol F in the UC framework, then a protocol πρ
∗
securely realizes πF
∗
in the UC framework.
The UC framework is to a certain extent a minimal requirement for the composition theorem.
In the classical case it was shown in [24] that a security notion comparable to the UC framework
naturally arises if one demands stand alone simulatability (see Section 4.1) and the existence of a
composition theorem.
5.2 Information Theoretical Security and Quantum Adversaries
One very interesting result proven in the quantum universal composability framework regards the
security of classical protocols with respect to a quantum adversary. Given a protocol which is proven
to be statistically secure against a classic adversary. Does it remain secure under quantum attacks?
Is the speed-up of quantum computing the only threat to classical protocols or could a quantum
attacker together with a quantum environment use entangled quantum information to break classical
protocols?
In [45] it was shown that whenever a protocol ρ realizes some ideal protocol F with respect to
statistical security in the UC framework, then ρ securely realizes F in the quantum composability
setting.
This result is very useful. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is composable (cf. Section 2.3)
and from QKD one can obtain composable secure communication [32]. Hence secure channels based
on quantum cryptography can be used instead of idealized secure channels in many cryptographic
settings, such as secure multiparty computations in presence of an honest majority [11].
5.3 Impossibility of Bit Commitment
Additionally to the impossibility of unconditionally secure bit commitment in quantum cryptog-
raphy [28, 25] a new impossibility result is introduced by the UC framework: Without additional
security assumptions bit commitment cannot be realized with computational security [10]. This
result generalizes to many more cryptographic tasks like coin flipping or oblivious transfer and it
also holds in the quantum case.
The reason for this impossibility result is that the simulator may no more act in retrospect and
without additional assumptions every simulation strategy for S could be turned into a cheating
strategy for the adversary A in the real protocol.
The additional assumptions used to allow for a computationally secure bit commitment can be a
trusted authority providing randomness to the protocol participants before the start of the protocol
(the Common Reference String (CRS)) [10], a trusted authority setting up a trusted public key
infrastructure, or the availability of tamper proof hardware. What is worse such set-up assumptions
are needed in quantum cryptography, too. The impossibility result of [10] directly carries over to
the quantum case thus in the UC framework quantum cryptographic protocols cannot even achieve
a computationally secure bit commitment without additional security assumptions.
So for many cryptographic tasks where the protocol participants are mutually mistrusting one has
a trade-off between the strength of the composability guarantees and the strength of the assumptions
needed to achieve these tasks. For certain applications the threats introduced by the additional
assumptions (e.g. the trusted authorities) weigh heavier than the threats introduced by improper
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composition of protocols and it seems that for this case there is no security notion which is without
a compromise.
As we will see in the next subsection the above impossibility result also affects the composability
of protocols in the bounded quantum storage model [13]. To allow for simulatable security in the
bounded quantum storage model the memory restrictions have to be different in the real and in the
ideal model, which results in difficulties when applying the composition theorem multiple times.
5.4 Composability in the Bounded Quantum Memory Model
Even though many interesting cryptographic tasks are not realizable from scratch these tasks can be
realized under very reasonable security assumptions, e.g. that the adversary is limited in performing
large coherent operations [37] or that the adversary has a quantum memory which is bounded in
size [13]. It was shown that the protocols in the bounded quantum storage model do compose
sequentially [47], however, the protocols as stated do not allow general composition. With an
example we will illustrate that this seems to be a general problem. To have a useful composition
theorem we need that the at least as secure as relation (≥) is transitive, because otherwise we cannot
repeatedly apply the composition theorem in the modular design of a cryptographic protocol. To
be able to conclude from π ≥ ρ and ρ ≥ F that π securely realizes F we need that the simulator in
the protocol ρ should be admitted as a real adversary for ρ if this protocol is to be compared with
F . In [20] it is shown that it is possible to achieve oblivious transfer (and hence bit commitment)
if the real adversary is restricted to have no quantum memory at all. However, the simulator for
this protocol needs quantum memory for the simulation. So if we restrict the simulator to have no
quantum memory oblivious transfer is not realizable any more and having different restrictions for
the real attacker and the simulator results in ≥ not being transitive. A way around this problem is
to generalize the notion of at least as secure as to one that explicitly involves the memory bound of
the adversary as a parameter, as proposed in [44].
6 Conclusions
This work reviewed composable security in quantum cryptography. In the first part of the paper
the focus was on quantum key distribution (QKD), the most prominent application of quantum
cryptography. We discussed the requirements that a composable security definition must fulfill and
illustrated the importance of these requirements by an attack which exploits a typical weakness of a
non-composable (but widely used) definition for secrecy. To show the utility of composable security,
we constructed a scheme to generate a continuous key stream by sequentially composing rounds of
a quantum key distribution protocol.
The second part of the work took a more general point of view, which is necessary for the study
of security applications involving general tasks as well as mutually distrustful parties. We explained
the universal composability framework and stated its composition theorem which gives strong com-
posability guarantees. Of special interest was the secure composition of quantum protocols into
unconditionally secure classical protocols. This shows that every unconditionally secure protocol
possible in the secure channel model is also possible with QKD and does not even need a new proof.
However, there are open problems left. A drawback of the universal composability framework is
that some tasks become impossible there without adding new security assumptions. E.g., quantum
bit commitment is impossible in the universal composability framework even with mere compu-
tational security or with respect to an attacker in the bounded quantum storage model. Hence
we observe a trade-off between the strong guarantees provided by universal composability and the
possibility of using fewer security assumptions. Addressing this trade-off remains an open problem.
A concrete approach may be to consider additional (weak) setup assumptions, e.g., a Common
Reference String as used in the classical model [10].
Another open question regards a weakness inherent to most existing security proofs in quantum
cryptography. These proofs typically rely on a specific model for the hardware the scheme is built on
(e.g., the photon sources and detectors used for optical QKD). Obviously, the security claims derived
for such a model generally only apply to implementations that strictly match the model. This,
however, is almost never the case in practice. Indeed, explicit attacks exploiting the deviation of the
implementation from the theoretical model have been demonstrated recently (see, e.g., [51, 26]). It
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would thus be desirable to have a (composable) framework that allows a more flexible modeling of
the underlying hardware devices.
Acknowledgments We would like to thank Gilles Brassard for helpful comments on an earlier
version of the manuscript.
References
[1] Andris Ambainis, Harry Buhrmann, Yevgeniy Dodis, and Hein Ro¨hrig. Multiparty quantum
coin flipping. In 19th Annual IEEE Conference on Computational Complexity (CCC 2004),
pages 250–259, 2004.
[2] Michael Backes, Birgit Pfitzmann, and Michael Waidner. The reactive simulatability (rsim)
framework for asynchronous systems. Inf. Comput., 205(12):1685–1720, 2007.
[3] Michael Ben-Or, Michal Horodecki, Debbie W. Leung, Dominic Mayers, and Jonathan Oppen-
heim. The universal composable security of quantum key distribution. In Second Theory of
Cryptography Conference TCC, volume 3378 of LNCS, pages 386–406, 2005.
[4] Michael Ben-Or and Dominic Mayers. General security definition and composability for quan-
tum & classical protocols. arXiv:quant-ph/0409062, 2004.
[5] Charles H. Bennett and Gilles Brassard. Quantum cryptography: Public-key distribution and
coin tossing. In Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Computers, Systems and
Signal Processing, pages 175–179, 1984.
[6] Eli Biham and Tal Mor. Security of quantum cryptography against collective attacks. Phys.
Rev. Lett., 78(11):2256–2259, 1997.
[7] Manuel Blum. Coin flipping by telephone: a protocol for solving impossible problems. ACM
SIGACT News, 15:23–27, 1983.
[8] Raymond Y. Q. Cai and Valerio Scarani. Finite-key analysis for practical implementations of
quantum key distribution. New J. Phys., 11:045024, 2009.
[9] Ran Canetti. Universally composable security: A new paradigm for cryptographic protocols.
In 42nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2001, pages 136–145,
2001.
[10] Ran Canetti and Marc Fischlin. Universally composable commitments. In Advances in Cryp-
tology — CRYPTO 2001, volume 2139 of LNCS, pages 19–40, 2001.
[11] David Chaum, Claude Cre´peau, and Ivan Damg˚ard. Multiparty unconditionally secure proto-
cols (extended abstract). In Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory
of Computing (STOC), pages 11–19, 1988.
[12] Thomas M. Cover and Joy A. Thomas. Elements of Information Theory. Wiley Series in
Telecommunications. Wiley, New York, 1991.
[13] Ivan B. Damg˚ard, Serge Fehr, Louis Salvail, and Christian Schaffner. Cryptography in the
bounded quantum-storage model. In 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Com-
puter Science (FOCS), pages 449–458, 2005.
[14] Anindya De, Christopher Portmann, Thomas Vidick, and Renato Renner. Trevisan’s extractor
in the presence of quantum side information. arXiv:0912.5514, 2009.
[15] Danny Dolev, Cynthia Dwork, and Moni Naor. Nonmalleable cryptography. SIAM J. Comput.,
30(2):391–437, 2000.
[16] Artur Ekert. Quantum cryptography based on Bell’s theorem. Phys. Rev. Lett., 67:661–663,
1991.
16
[17] Oded Goldreich. Foundations of Cryptography – II Basic Applications, volume 2. Cambridge
University Press, 2004.
[18] Shafi Goldwasser, Silvio Micali, and Charles Rackoff. The knowledge complexity of interactive
proof-systems (extended abstract). In Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annual ACM Symposium
on Theory of Computing (STOC), pages 291–304, 1985.
[19] Lucien Hardy and Adrian Kent. Cheat sensitive quantum bit commitment. Phys. Rev. Lett.,
92(157901), 2004.
[20] Dennis Hofheinz and Jo¨rn Mu¨ller-Quade. A paradox of quantum universal com-
posability. Poster at the 4th European QIPC Workshop, 2003. Abstract online at
http://www.quiprocone.org/Oxford/Abstracts.htm, 2003.
[21] Russell Impagliazzo and Steven Rudich. Limits on the provable consequences of one-way per-
mutations. In Shafi Goldwasser, editor, Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO 1988, LNCS,
1988.
[22] Ming-Yang Kao, editor. Encyclopedia of Algorithms, chapter Quantum key distribution.
Springer, 2008.
[23] Robert Ko¨nig, Renato Renner, Andor Bariska, and Ueli Maurer. Small accessible quantum
information does not imply security. Phys. Rev. Lett., 98:140502, 2007.
[24] Yehuda Lindell. General composition and universal composability in secure multi-party com-
putation. In 44th Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS 2003), 2003.
[25] Hoi-Kwong Lo and H. F. Chau. Why quantum bit commitment and ideal quantum coin tossing
are impossible. In PhysComp96: Proceedings of the Fourth Workshop on Physics and Compu-
tation, pages 177–187, 1998.
[26] Vadim Makarov. Controlling passively quenched single photon detectors by bright light. New
J. Phys., 11:065003, 2009.
[27] Ueli Maurer. Indistinguishability of random systems. In Lars Knudsen, editor, Advances in
Cryptology — EUROCRYPT 2002, volume 2332 of LNCS, pages 110–132, 2002.
[28] Dominic Mayers. Unconditionally secure bit commitment is impossible. Phys. Rev. Lett.,
78:3414–3417, 1997.
[29] Jo¨rn Mu¨ller-Quade and Rainer Steinwandt. On the problem of authentication in a quantum
protocol to detect traffic analysis. Quantum Information and Computation, 3(1):48–54, 2003.
[30] Jo¨rn Mu¨ller-Quade and Dominique Unruh. Long-term security and universal composability. In
4th Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2007, LNCS, pages 41–60, 2007.
[31] Birgit Pfitzmann and Michael Waidner. A model for asynchronous reactive systems and its
application to secure message transmission. In Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE Symp. on Security
and Privacy, 2001.
[32] Dominik Raub, Rainer Steinwandt, and Jo¨rn Mu¨ller-Quade. On the security and composability
of the one time pad. In 31st Conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer
Science, SOFSEM 2005, volume 3381 of LNCS, pages 288–297, 2005.
[33] Renato Renner. Security of Quantum Key Distribution. PhD thesis, Swiss Federal Institute of
Technology (ETH) Zurich, 2005. Electronic version: arXiv:quant-ph/0512258.
[34] Renato Renner. Symmetry of large physical systems implies independence of subsystems. Na-
ture Physics, 3(9):645–649, 2007.
[35] Renato Renner and Robert Ko¨nig. Universally composable privacy amplification against quan-
tum adversaries. In Second Theory of Cryptography Conference TCC, volume 3378 of LNCS,
pages 407–425. 2005.
17
[36] Alexander Russell and Hong Wang. How to fool an unbounded adversary with a short key. In
Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT 2002, volume 2332, pages 133–148, 2002.
[37] Louis Salvail. Quantum bit commitment from a physical assumption. In Advances in Cryptology
— CRYPTO 1998, volume 1462 of LNCS, pages 338–353, 1998.
[38] Valerio Scarani, Helle Bechmann-Pasquinucci, Nicolas J. Cerf, Miloslav Dusek, Norbert
Lu¨tkenhaus, and Momtchil Peev. The security of practical quantum key distribution. Rev.
Mod. Phys., 81, 2009.
[39] Valerio Scarani and Renato Renner. Quantum cryptography with finite resources: Uncondi-
tional security bound for discrete-variable protocols with one-way postprocessing. Phys. Rev.
Lett., 100:200501, 2008.
[40] Peter W. Shor and John Preskill. Simple proof of security of the BB84 quantum key distribution
protocol. Phys. Rev. Lett., 85:441–444, 2000.
[41] Rainer Steinwandt, Dominik Janzing, and Thomas Beth. On using quantum protocols to detect
traffic analysis. Quantum Information and Computation, 1(3):62–69, 2001.
[42] Marco Tomamichel, Christian Schaffner, Adam Smith, and Renato Renner. Leftover hashing
against quantum side information. arXiv:1002.2436, 2010.
[43] Dominique Unruh. Simulatable security for quantum protocols. arXiv:quant-ph/0409125, 2004.
[44] Dominique Unruh. Concurrent composition in the bounded quantum storage model.
http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/229, 2010.
[45] Dominique Unruh. Universally composable quantum multi-party computation. In Advances in
Cryptology — EUROCRYPT 2010, volume 6110 of LNCS, pages 486–505, 2010.
[46] Mark N. Wegman and J. Lawrence Carter. New hash functions and their use in authentication
and set equality. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 22:265–279, 1981.
[47] Stephanie Wehner and Ju¨rg Wullschleger. Composable security in the bounded-quantum-
storage model. In Automata, Languages and Programming, 35th International Colloquium,
ICALP 2008, pages 604–615, 2008.
[48] Stephen Wiesner. Conjugate coding. Sigact News, 15(1):78–88, 1983.
[49] Andrew Chi Chih Yao. Protocols for secure computations (extended abstract). In Proceedings
of the 14th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), 1982.
[50] Andrew Chi Chih Yao. Security of quantum protocols against coherent measurements. In
Proceedings of 26th Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing (STOC), pages
67–75, 1995.
[51] Yi Zhao, Chi Hang Fred Fung, Bing Qi, Christine Chen, and Hoi Kwong Lo. Quantum hacking:
Experimental demonstration of time shift attack against practical quantum key-distribution
systems. Phys. Rev. A, 78:04233, 2008.
18
